THE UNITED AMERICAS STRATEGIC STATIC WARFARE SURVEY
(Tientsin Campaign)
April 2181
Foreword
The United Americas Strategic Static Warfare Survey was established by the Secretary of Defence on April the 3rd, 2181, pursuant to a directive from the President of the United Americas, to investigate the devolution of United States Colonial Marine Corp (USCMC) forces involved in the Tientsin Campaign from typical positional and rapid mobility based warfare into static trench based warfare.
The evolution of human warfare from the Second World War until the present day has seen increases in mobility that preclude the evolution of trench based warfare, ergo the fact that the Tientsin Campaign devolved into static warfare wherein the typically mobile forces of the USCMC were forced into static defensive lines was seen as atypical and thus worthy of study to avoid.
The officers of the Survey were:
- Alan Bentway (Chairman-USCMC)
- Jo–@@%!
- …
USCMC Anti-Tank Squad
[REDACTED ERROR]
Chemical Warfare
Large scale deployment of biological and chemical weapons by OpFor factions, due to stipulations of Geneva Conventions not being applied to extra-solar systems, rendered large areas of Tientsin uninhabitable for human life and thus necessitated large scale deployment of Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Warfare protective systems for frontline Marine and Colonial Militia forces.
(evidence for deployment of bio/chem weapons by USCMC or allied UA forces [Data Expunged] [TOP SECRET] NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)
One of the highest long-term consequences for USCMC veterans from the Tientsin campaign is effects of exposure to chemical warfare systems. It was deemed that current NBC protective systems afford USCMC forces sufficient protection to ensure retained combat effectiveness during combat scenarios in the short term.
Long term considerations are not taken into account.
Colonial Militia (Allied USCMC) demonstrating low-grade NBC/weaponry protective systems
Loss Of Mobile Warfare
Research has concluded that primary factors to loss of mobility based warfare can be attributed due to extreme presence of ECM and ECCM systems employed by all forces in planetary zones precluding effective usage of aero and close orbital support systems and a critical lack of effective high-tech armaments for both sides.
The reality of our current economic systems is that USCMC forces do not possess sufficient advance vehicular equipment for large scale and sustained combat operations against a peer enemy. Industrial replenishment for these systems is insufficient to replace combat losses, ergo frontline forces were forced to sequester away valuable high-tech systems in favour of direct infantry replacements.
Mechanized battalions would come to be seen as Infantry battalions in all but name.
USS Sulaco and USS Narcissus providing in-close system orbital support above Tientsin
Trench Warfare
The scourge of the old world. Trench warfare become a necessity of life on Tientsin due to the aforementioned loss of positional based warfare options.
Orbital bombardment was not precise enough to eliminate specific enemy concentrations, but precise enough that large group concentrations of enemy forces could not occur. Trench systems offered high level success at reducing casualties from orbital strikes to a level of acceptable tolerance to all warring factions. Furthermore the trench networks offered better means to defend against biological attacks due to advances in filtration room systems.
The horrors of trench warfare, considered a barbaric and outmoded state of war thought impossible to return to, became the norm.
UPP Conscripts advancing under suppressing gunfire
Casualties
Modern USCMC forces, and likely their OpFor counterparts, were not trained for trench warfare but were trained in regards to positional based warfare of high mobility and rapid redeployment. Ergo the lessons of the 20th century had to be relearned in the 22nd century. Graduation from rapid insertions and quick deployments into suppressing fire, rolling bombardment and months long attrition based attacks became the norm.
Typically local colonial militias and proxy forces would bear the brunt of these casualties by both factions with rear-guard forces typically being USCMC or UPP regular forces. This reduced morale issues on Earth.
UPP Regular Army Shock Troops Pre-Deployment
Airpower
Lack of either faction to assume air superiority, or even parity, ensured a impossibility of breaking the stalemate. High orbital warships could not assume combat positions long enough to bear sufficent firepower of note before being at risk of ground to orbit systems, whereas aero force units could not operate with any degree of effectiveness outside of deployment of long-range glide, unguided, systems.
Furthermore the sequestering of high-tech systems meant high-tech munitions were rarely deployed.
UPP Aligned Colonial Militia (Suspected Precursor to CLF)
Distinct lack of NBC warfare protective systems noted
((art; https://www.artstation.com/artwork/4XZ9k4))
Summation Notes
Keynotes for future consideration
- Further developments in anti-ECM warfare systems are required to allow deployment of aero and orbital systems
- Expansion of military industrial systems are required to ensure the United Americas is ready to meet the industrial requirements of war
- Expansion of military recruitment systems are required to ensure the United Americas is ready to meet the expenditures of manpower during a war
- Improved basic training programs for USCMC forces in non-positional based warfare
- Re-orientation of public perceptions regarding casualty sustainment in armed conflict.
- Cooperation with Corporate Allies in pursuing alternative methods of conducting warfare palatable to public and military requirements.
It is our belief that failure to address these above topics will risk future peer on peer combat between the United Americans and a possible OpFor will replicate the disastrous outcomes of the Tientsin Campaign. Static warfare is the worst possible outcome in any conflict for all sides.